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Sayan Bhattacharya∗ Gagan Goel† Sreenivas Gollapudi‡ Kamesh Munagala§
Abstract
In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem of designing revenue
optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when
bidders have arbitrary demand and budget constraints (and additive valuations). Our mechanisms are
surprisingly simple: We show that a sequential all-pay mechanism is a 4 approximation to the revenue
of the optimal ex-interim truthful mechanism with a discrete type space for each bidder, where her
valuations for different items can be correlated. We also show that a sequential posted price mechanism
is a O(1) approximation to the revenue of the optimal ex-post truthful mechanism when the type space
of each bidder is a product distribution that satisfies the standard hazard rate condition. We further show
a logarithmic approximation when the hazard rate condition is removed, and complete the picture by
showing that achieving a sub-logarithmic approximation, even for regular distributions and one bidder,
requires pricing bundles of items. Our results are based on formulating novel LP relaxations for these
problems, and developing generic rounding schemes from first principles.
1 Introduction
In several scenarios, such as the Google TV ad auction [25] and the the FCC spectrum auctions [10], where
auctions have been applied in the recent past, bidders are constrained by the amount of money they can
spend. This leads to the study of auctions with budget-constrained bidders, which is the focus of this paper.
The key difficulty with budgets is that the utility of a bidder is only quasi-linear as long as the price is
below the budget constraint, but is −∞ if the price exceeds the budget. As a consequence, well-known
mechanisms such as the VCG mechanism are no longer directly applicable. Before proceeding further, we
formally define our model.
1.1 Our Model
There are m bidders and n heterogeneous items. The type of a bidder is defined as the collection of her
valuations for each item; we will assume throughout the paper that her valuations for different items are
additive. Further, her type is private knowledge. We augment this basic model for bidder i with two publicly
known constraints: A demand constraint ni on the maximum number of items she is willing to buy, and a
budget constraint Bi on the maximum total price she can afford to pay. Her utility is defined as follows:
Suppose she gets a subset A of items where |A| ≤ ni, and pays a total price Pi. If vij denotes her valuation
for item j, then her utility is given by
∑
j∈A vij − Pi if Pi ≤ Bi, and −∞ otherwise. The goal of the
auctioneer is to design a mechanism that maximizes its revenue, which is defined as
∑
i Pi. We require that
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the mechanism be incentive compatible in that no bidder gains in utility by misreporting her valuations, and
individually rational, meaning that a bidder gets nonnegative utility by reporting the truth. Some of our
results generalize to the case where the budget constraints are private knowledge.
There are two well-established ways of proceeding from here. In the adversarial setting, no assump-
tions are made on the valuations, while in the Bayesian setting, it is assumed the valuations are drawn from
publicly known prior distributions. We take the latter Bayesian approach, which was pioneered by Myer-
son [24]. As mentioned above, in this setting, the bidders’ private valuations are drawn from independent
(but not necessarily identical) commonly known prior distributions. The auctioneer’s goal is to maximize
her expected revenue, where the expectation is over the prior distributions, and possible randomization intro-
duced by the mechanism itself. In the Bayesian setting, the notions of truthfulness and individual rationality
can be of two kinds:
Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC): Here, each bidder’s expected utility is maximized by truth-telling,
where the expectation is over the valuations of the other bidders (which are drawn according to their
priors) and the randomness introduced by the mechanism. In other words, truth-telling is optimal only
in expectation.
Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DISC): In this setting, truth-telling is optimal for the bidder
even if she knows the valuations of the other bidders and the random choices made by the mechanism.
We note that traditionally, the terms BIC and DSIC only refer to randomness introduced by other bid-
ders’ valuations via the prior distributions. Therefore, to be very precise, the space of mechanisms is
two-dimensional, randomized versus universally truthful mechanisms on one dimension, and BIC versus
DSIC mechanisms on the other. We collapse this space to randomized BIC versus universally truthful DSIC
mechanisms, so as not to introduce additional terminology.
1.2 Our Results
Our results depend on the structure of the type space of each bidder. In particular, the results depend on
whether the distributions of the valuations of a bidder for different items are correlated or independent. We
note that the correlations if any are only for valuations of one bidder for different items; the distributions of
the valuations of different bidders are always assumed to be independent. All our results can be viewed as
presenting simple characterizations of approximately optimal mechanisms in these contexts.
We will first consider the situation when valuations of a bidder for different items are arbitrarily cor-
related, so that the type space of a bidder is simply specified as a poly-bounded discrete distribution. In
Section 2, we present a simple all-pay mechanism: it charges each bidder a fixed price that depends only on
its revealed type, while the allocation made to the bidder will be random depending on the types of other
bidders. The resulting scheme is therefore only BIC; however, we show that it is a 4 approximation to the
revenue of the optimal BIC scheme (Theorem 2.1).
An all-pay auction is unrealistic in several situations, since a bidder is forced to participate even if she
obtains negative utility when the auction concludes. A natural question to ask is whether there exists a
DSIC mechanism with good revenue properties. However, it is an easy exercise to show that the problem
of designing an optimal DSIC mechanism for one unit-demand bidder (ni = 1) whose type can take one
of n arbitrarily correlated possibilities with equal probability, reduces to the problem of unlimited supply
envy-free pricing with n bidders [19]. For the envy free pricing problem, the best known is a logarithmic
approximation, and there is strong evidence that a better approximation is not possible [8]. Furthermore, in
the correlated valuation setting, there are examples showing an unbounded gap between the revenues of the
optimal randomized (BIC) and deterministic (DSIC) mechanisms [9]. This significantly dims the possibility
of a constant factor approximate DSIC mechanism with discrete correlated types.
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In view of the above negative result, we assume the valuations of a bidder for different items follow
independent distributions. This product distribution assumption is also used by Chawla et. al. [11], who
consider the special case of a single bidder with unit demand. In this special case, it is easy to see that any
DSIC mechanism is a posted price mechanism, and they show a constant factor approximation to its revenue
by an elegant connection to Myerson’s mechanism [24]. Independently of our work, Chawla et al. [12]
extend their result to show a O(1) approximation for multiple unit-demand bidders. However, this result
also crucially require the unit-demand assumption.
In Section 3.2, we show that for arbitrary demands and budgets, when the type of each bidder follows
a product distribution where each dimension satisfies the standard monotone hazard rate (MHR), there is a
constant factor approximation to the revenue of optimal BIC mechanism. Our mechanism is achieved by a
DSIC mechanism with surprisingly simple structure: Consider the bidders sequentially in arbitrary order,
and for each bidder, offer a subset of remaining items at a pre-computed price for each item; the bidder
simply chooses the utility maximizing bundle of these items. This posted price mechanism shows a constant
factor gap between the revenues of the optimal BIC and DSIC mechanisms (Theorem 3.6), which is in
sharp contrast with the corresponding negative result [9] when the type space of a bidder is correlated. The
surprising aspect of our result is that since the optimal DSIC mechanism for general demands and budgets
will price bundles of items, there is no a priori reason to expect that the more simplistic scheme of posting
prices for each item would be a constant approximation.
We show (Section 3.3) that the MHR condition is indeed necessary for our item pricing result: If this
condition is slightly relaxed to regular product distributions and one bidder, the optimal DSIC mechanism
will price bundles of items, and will have a logarithmic gap against the revenue of the optimal item pricing
scheme. We show that this gap is tight by showing the existence of a posted price mechanism achieving this
approximation ratio (Theorem 3.8). On a positive note, we conclude by proving that for regular distributions,
if the space of feasible mechanisms is restricted to those that consider bidders in some adaptive order and
post prices that may depend on the outcomes so far, there is a O(1) approximation within this space, that
considers bidders in an arbitrary but fixed order, and pre-computes the posted prices (Theorem 3.10).
1.3 Related Work
The Bayesian setting is widely studied in the economics literature [4, 10, 13, 14, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28]. In this
setting, the optimal (either BIC or DSIC) mechanism can always be computed by encoding the incentive
compatibility constraints in an integer program and maximizing expected revenue. However, the number
of variables (and constraints) in this IP is exponential in the number of bidders, there being variables for
the allocations and prices for each scenario of revealed types. Therefore, the key difficulty in the Bayesian
mechanism design case is computational: Can the optimal (or approximately optimal) auction be efficiently
computed and implemented?
Much of the literature in economics considers the case where the auctioneer has one item (or multiple
copies of the item). In the absence of budget constraints, Myerson [24] presents the characterization of
any BIC mechanism in terms of expected allocation made to a bidder: This allocation must be monotone
in the revealed valuation of the bidder, and furthermore, the expected price is given by applying the VCG
calculation to the expected allocation. This yields a linear-time computable optimal revenue-maximizing
auction that is both BIC and DSIC. The key issue with budget constraints is that the allocations need to
be thresholded in order for the prices to be below the budgets [13, 22, 26]. However, even in this case,
the optimal BIC auction follows from a polymatroid characterization that can be solved by the Ellipsoid
algorithm and an all-pay condition [6, 26]. By all-pay, we mean that the bidder pays a fixed amount given
his revealed type, regardless of the allocation made. This also yields a DSIC mechanism that is O(1)
approximation to optimal BIC revenue [5], but the result holds only for homogeneous items.
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An alternative line of work deals with the adversarial setting, where no distributional assumption is
made on the bidders’ private valuations. In this setting, the budget constrained auction problem is notori-
ous mainly because standard auction concepts such as VCG, efficiency, and competitive equilibria do not
directly carry over [25]. Most previous results deal with the case of multiple units of a homogeneous good.
In this setting, based on the random partitioning framework of Goldberg et al. [18], Borgs et al. [7] pre-
sented a truthful auction whose revenue is asymptotically within a constant factor of the optimal revenue
(see also [1]). If the focus is instead on optimizing social welfare, no non-trivial truthful mechanism can
optimize social welfare [7]. Therefore, the focus has been on weaker notions than efficiency, such as Pareto-
optimality, where no pair of agents (including the auctioneer) can simultaneously improve their utilities by
trading with each other. Dobzinski et al. [16] present an ascending price auction based on the clinching
auction of Ausubel [2], which they show to be the only Pareto-optimal auction in the public budget setting.
This result was extended to the private budget setting by Bhattacharya et al. [5]; see [20] for a related result.
Finally, several researchers have considered the behavior specific types of auctions, for instance, auctions
that are sequential by item and second price within each item [4, 17], and ascending price auctions [3, 10].
The goal here is to analyze the improvement in revenue (or social welfare) by optimal sequencing, or to
study incentive compatibility of commonly used ascending price mechanisms. However, analyzing the
performance of sequential or ascending price auctions is difficult in general, and there is little known in
terms of optimal mechanisms (or even approximately optimal mechanisms) in these settings.
1.4 Our Techniques
If for every bidder, the valuations for different items are correlated (Section 2), then the optimal BIC revenue
can be bounded from above by a linear program (LP1) that requires the incentive compatibility, voluntary
participation, supply and demand constraints to hold only in expectation. We construct a BIC all pay auction
(Figure 1) that basically implements a rounding scheme on the optimal solution to LP1, loosing a constant
factor in revenue (Theorem 2.1). This approach is based on the techniques used in [5].
As mentioned before, Chawla et. al. [11] consider the Bayesian unit-demand pricing problem. There
are n heterogeneous items, a single bidder with unit demand, and her valuations (vj for item j ∈ [1, . . . , n])
are drawn from independent distributions. They present an elegant pricing scheme that is a constant approx-
imation to optimal revenue by upper bounding it using the revenue of Myerson’s auction in the following
setting: There is a single item, n bidders, and valuation of each bidder j follows the same distribution as
that of vj . However, this technique cannot be applied if the unit demand assumption is removed.
In contrast, our approach to the independent valuations setting (Section 3) does not require the unit-
demand assumption, and is based on a novel LP relaxation (LPREV) for the problem (Lemma 3.1). Unlike
the LP relaxation of Section 2 and perhaps surprisingly, LPREV does not encode any incentive compati-
bility constraints, and our DSIC mechanism (Figure 2), that competes against this LP, is in fact a constant
approximation to optimal BIC revenue. One limitation of our approach is that we have to (necessarily) as-
sume the bidders’ valuations satisfy montone hazard rate (MHR). In the process of proving our main result
(Theorem 3.6), we describe a crucial property of MHR distributions (Lemma 3.3) that can be used to extend
the type of results shown in [21]. For example, in multi-item settings with only demand constraints, posted
price schemes generate revenue that is a constant factor of the optimal social welfare, assuming MHR dis-
tributions (Corollary 3.7). The LP formulations also generalize the stochastic matching setting in Chen et
al. [15].
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2 Correlated Valuations: BIC Mechanisms
We first consider the problem of approximating the optimal Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism.
There are m bidders and n indivisible items. The type t of a bidder is a n-vector 〈v1t, v2t, . . . , vnt〉, which
specifies her valuations for the items. For bidder i, we assume the types follow a publicly known discrete
distribution with polynomial support, where for t = t1, t2, . . . , tK , we have fi(t) = Pr[Type = t]. The
distributions for different bidders are independent. Note that the above model allows the valuations of a
bidder for different items to possibly be correlated. The bidder can afford to pay at most a publicly known
budget Bi, and is interested in at most ni ≥ 1 items. (Our scheme extends to private budgets using the
techniques in [5].) We will be interested in mechanisms that can be computed in time polynomial in the
input size, i.e., in n,m, and K .
For reported types~t, the auctioneer computes allocation of items Si(~t) for each bidder i. It also computes
prices Pi(~t). The subsets Si(~t) of items need to be disjoint, and Pi(~t) ≤ Bi. The utility of a bidder for
obtaining subset S at price P when her type is t is
∑
j∈S vjt − P . A mechanism should be incentive
compatible in the following sense: For any bidder i, her expected utility, where the expectation is over the
types of other bidders, is maximized if she reveals her true type. The auctioneer is interested in designing
an incentive compatible mechanism that maximizes revenue: E~t
[∑
i Pi(~t)
]
.
We now show an all-pay auction mechanism that is a 4-approximation to optimal revenue. Our LP
relaxation and solution technique are inspired by the rounding scheme in [5] for multi-unit auctions.
Linear Programming Relaxation. Throughout, we will denote bidders by i, items by j, and types by t.
For any feasible mechanism, let xij(t) denote the probability that bidder i obtains item j if her reported type
is t. Let Pi(t) denote the expected price paid by bidder i when she bids type t. We have the following LP:
Maximize
∑
i,t
fi(t)Pi(t) (LP1)
∑
i,t fi(t)xij(t) ≤ 1 ∀j∑
j xij(t) ≤ ni ∀i, t∑
j vjtxij(t)− Pi(t) ≥
∑
j vjtxij(s)− Pi(s) ∀i, t, s∑
j vjtxij(t)− Pi(t) ≥ 0 ∀i, t
xij(t) ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, j, t
Pi(t) ∈ [0, Bi] ∀i, t
The optimal Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism is feasible for the above constraints: The first
constraint simply encodes that in expectation, each item is assigned to at most one bidder; the second
constraint encodes the demand. The third and fourth constraints encodes Bayesian incentive compatibility
and individual rationality. Therefore, the LP1 value is an upper bound on the expected revenue.
Theorem 2.1. The All Pay Auction (Figure 1) is Bayesian Incentive Compatible, and its revenue is a 4
approximation to the optimal BIC mechanism for heterogeneous items.
Proof. Note that ∑iXij ≤ 12 for all items j, since we scaled down the LP variables. Furthermore, Zij =∏
i′<i(1−Xij) ≥ 1−
∑
i′<iXij ≥
1
2 . This implies
1/2
Zij
≤ 1.
In Step 6, J denotes the set of available items. When bidder i is encountered in the predefined (but
arbirtrary) ordering, the set Wi is initialized to ∅. In each group Gitik, a single item j is selected with
probability x˜ij(ti). If j ∈ J , it is added to Wi with probability 1/2Zij (which is at most 1), and regardless of
the outcome of this random event, j is removed from J .
In the discussion below, all expectations are with respect the bids revealed by bidders i′ < i and the
random choices made in constructing Wi. Since the values revealed by bidders i′ < i are independent, item
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j is available when bidder i is considered with probability exactly
∏
i′<i(1−Xij) = Zij . Therefore:
Pr[j ∈Wi] = Zij · x˜ij(ti) · 1/(2Zij) = x˜ij(ti)/2 = x
∗
ij(ti)/4
By linearity of expectation, the expected welfare of items allocated to bidder i is precisely 14
∑
j vjtix
∗
ij(ti).
Since bidder i pays a fixed price P ∗i (ti)/4, both the expected welfare and expected price are scaled down
by a factor exactly 4 relative to the LP values regardless of her revealed type. This preserves the incentive
compatibility constraints in the LP, and makes the scheme be truthful and satisfy voluntary participation in
expectation over the types of other bidders and the randomness introduced by the mechanism. The theorem
follows.
All Pay Auction
1. Choose an arbitrary but fixed ordering of all bidders and denote it by 1, . . . ,m
2. Find the optimal solution to LP1, and denote the variable values by {x∗ij(t), P ∗i (t)}
3. For all bidders i, items j, types t, let
x˜ij(t) = x
∗
ij(t)/2,
Xij =
∑
t fi(t)x˜ij(t),
Zij =
∏
i′<i(1−Xij)
4. FOR all bidders i, types t,
Partition the items into ni disjoint groups s.t. in each group Gitk,
∑
j∈Gitk
x˜ij(t) ≤ 1
5. Collect the reported types of all bidders. Denote the reported type of bidder i by ti
6. Initialize J to be the set of all items.
FOR i = 1, 2, . . . m,
Initialize Wi ← ∅
FOR k = 1 to ni
Pick a single item j ∈ Gitik w.p. x˜ij(ti)
IF j ∈ J
Wi ←Wi ∪ {j} w.p. 1/2Zij
J ← J \ {j}
Bidder i gets the (random) set Wi, and pays a (fixed) price P ∗i (ti)/4
Figure 1: BIC Mechanism for correlated valuations
We note that by replacing the objective function with ∑i,j,t fi(t)vjtxij(t), the resulting scheme is a 4
approximation to the optimal expected social welfare (or any linear combination of revenue and welfare).
3 Independent Valuations: DSIC Mechanisms
The All Pay Auction (Figure 1) satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints only in expectation over the
valuations of the other bidders and randomness introduced by the mechanism. In practice, it is more de-
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sirable to consider mechanisms that satisfy these properties ex-post. As mentioned before (Section 1.2), in
general, it is likely to be hard to approximate such mechanisms, and this hardness comes from the type space
of a bidder being correlated. However, we show that for the important special case of product distributions
with the hazard rate condition, a constant factor approximation follows from sequential posted price mech-
anisms. Such a mechanism considers the bidders sequentially in arbitrary order, and for each bidder, posts
a subset of remaining items at certain price for each item, and lets the bidder choose the utility maximizing
bundle of these items. Such a scheme is ex-post incentive compatible by definition.
Formally, there are n distinct indivisible goods each of unit quantity, and m bidders. Bidder i has
publicly known budget Bi on the total price she is willing to pay. Her utility for paying more than this
price is −∞; as long as the budget constraint is satisfied, the utility for any item is quasi-linear, i.e., the
valuation obtained minus price, thresholded below at zero. The valuations for different items are additive,
and she can buy more than one item, but at most some ni ≥ 1 items. Her valuation for item j is a positive
integer-valued random variable vij ∈ [1, Lij ] following publicly known distributions. Though we assume
the distributions are defined at positive integer values, this is w.l.o.g., since we can discretize continuous
distributions in powers of (1 + ǫ) and apply the same arguments. This also holds when the values taken by
the random variables are not polynomially bounded.
Key Assumption. We will present ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms under the following key prod-
uct distribution assumption: The valuations vij for each (i, j) follow independent distributions.
Under the above assumption we consider two cases: (1) The random variables vij satisfy the monotone
hazard rate condition (Section 3.2), and (2) The random variables vij are arbitrary integer valued variables
over the domain [1, L] (Section 3.3). In the former case, we show that sequential posted prices are a O(1)
approximation to the optimal BIC mechanism (Theorem 3.6), whereas in the latter case, they are a O(logL)
approximation, and doing better necessarily requires pricing bundles of items rather than individual items
(Theorem 3.8).
Proof Sketch of Theorem 3.6. First, observe that in order to enforce individual rationality, whenever item
j is allocated to bidder i, the expected revenue generated across edge (i, j) is at most Vij = min(vij , Bi).
Let xij(r) denote the probability that bidder i gets item j when Vij = r. If we require the demand, budget
and supply constraints to hold only in expectation, the revenue of any mechanism can be upper bounded
by a linear program with variables xij(r) (Lemma 3.1). Interestingly, this linear program (LPREV) does
not encode incentive compatibility constraints. Thus, any DSIC scheme that is constant competitive against
LPREV will also be a O(1) approximation to optimal BIC revenue.
Note that if vij satisfies MHR, then Vij also satisfies MHR (Claim 3.2). Next, we make the crucial ob-
servation that if the prior on a bidder’s valuation is MHR, then with constant probability her virtual valuation
is within a constant factor of her valuation (Lemma 3.3). Thus, replacing Vij by the corresponding virtual
valuation function ϕij , we get a new linear program (LP2) that is still a good approximation to LPREV
and hence to optimal revenue (Lemma 3.4). Using Myerson’s characterization of virtual valuations [24], we
show that the optimal solution to LP2 has a nice structure (Lemma 3.5). Roughly speaking, it treats each
edge (i, j) as a separate bidder with valuation given by the random variable Vij . Finally, we employ an in-
teresting rounding technique (Figure 2) on the optimal solution to LP2, and get a DSIC item pricing scheme
that looses a constant factor in revenue. Since we need to apply Markov’s inequality during the rounding
phase, we revisit the definition of Vij and scale down the reported budget by a suitable factor (Definition 1).
This implies LPREV is an upper bound on optimal revenue up to a constant factor; rest of the proof remains
the same.
One issue with auctions where bidders are budget and demand constrained is that given posted prices
for the items, the bidder needs to solve a two-dimensional KNAPSACK problem to determine her optimal
bundle, and this is NP-HARD in general. However, this aspect does not change our results: Our upper bound
LP2 is the best possible revenue regardless of what optimization the bidders perform, and furthermore, our
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analysis of the algorithm in Figure 2 simply shows that with constant probability, the bidder solves a trivial
knapsack instance where all items fit into the knapsack. Therefore, as long as the bidder uses any reasonable
KNAPSACK heuristic, our results hold.
3.1 Linear Programming Relaxation
We first present a simple bound on the revenue of any BIC mechanism. In the ensuing discussion, we will
denote bidders by i and items by j.
Definition 1. Define Vij = min(vij , Bi/4) and let its density function be fij .
Maximize
∑
i,j
∑
r
rfij(r)xij(r) (LPREV)
∑
j
∑
r fij(r)xij(r) ≤ ni ∀i (1)∑
j
∑
r rfij(r)xij(r) ≤ Bi ∀i (2)∑
i
∑
r fij(r)xij(r) ≤ 1 ∀j (3)
xij(r) ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, j, r (4)
Lemma 3.1. The optimal value of the program (LPREV) is at least a factor 1/4 of the revenue of the optimal
BIC mechanism. Furthermore, in the LP solution, xij(r) is a monotonically non-decreasing function of r.
Proof. Without any loss of generality, we assume that whenever a bidder is allocated a bundle of items, the
total price she has to pay is distributed amongst the individual items obtained. Since the mechanism satisfies
the individual rationality condition in expectation, it is easy to ensure that the expected price on a single
item is never greater than the valuation for the item or the overall budget. Let xij(r) denote the expected
amount of item j bidder i obtains when Vij = r, and let pij(r) denote the expected price paid conditioned
on obtaining the item. It is easy to see that pij(r) ≤ 4r. The revenue of the optimal BIC mechanism can be
relaxed as:
Maximize
∑
i,j
∑
r
pij(r)fij(r)xij(r)
∑
j
∑
r fij(r)xij(r) ≤ ni ∀i (1)∑
j
∑
r pij(r)fij(r)xij(r) ≤ Bi ∀i (2)∑
i
∑
r fij(r)xij(r) ≤ 1 ∀j (3)
xij(r) ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, j, r (4)
pij(r) ∈ [0, 4r] ∀i, j, r (5)
The above program is nonlinear. Scale pij(r) down by a factor of 4 so that pij(r) ≤ r. This preserves
the constraints and loses a factor of 4 in the objective. Now, for all i, j, if pij(r) < r, increase pij(r) and
decrease xij(r) while preserving their product until pij(r) becomes equal to r. This yields the constraints of
(LPREV), and preserves the objective; but now, the objective becomes ∑i,j∑r rfij(r)xij(r). This shows
(LPREV) is a 4-approximation to the revenue of the optimal BIC mechanism.
To show that the objective is maximized when the xij(r) are monotonically non-decreasing in r, for any
(i, j), preserve
∑
r rfij(r)xij(r) by increasing xij(s2) and decreasing xij(s1) for s1 < s2. In this process,∑
r fij(r)xij(r) must decrease, preserving all the constraints, which implies the monotonicity.
We note that because of the presence of budget constraints, (LPREV) bounds only the expected revenue
of the ex-post mechanism and not the expected social welfare, which can be larger by an unbounded amount.
However, if the budget constraints are removed, the resulting LP also bounds the optimal social welfare.
8
3.2 Monotone Hazard Rates
We will now present a constant factor approximation to the optimal BIC mechanism via sequential posted
price schemes, assuming the random variables vij satisfy the monotone hazard rate condition.
Definition 2. The distribution of vij satisfies the monotone hazard rate (MHR) condition if Pr[vij >
r]/Pr[vij = r] is a non-increasing function of r.
Claim 3.2. If v is a random variable satisfying the monotone hazard rate condition, then min(v, a) satisfies
the MHR condition for any integer a ≥ 1.
It follows that the Vij also satisfy the MHR condition.
Definition 3 (Myerson [24]). Let Gij(r) = Pr[Vij > r]. Define the virtual valuation as ϕij(r) = r −
Gij(r)/fij(r). This is said to be regular if it is a non-decreasing function of r.
Clearly, MHR distributions are regular. We now present the crucial lemma for MHR distributions.
Lemma 3.3. Let φ(v) denote the virtual valuation function for a positive integer valued random variable
v ∈ [1, L] satisfying the MHR condition. Then, Pr[φ(v) ≥ v2 ] ≥ 1e2 .
Proof. Let f(t) = Pr[v = t] and G(t) = Pr[v > t]. Let h(t) = f(t)/G(t) denote the hazard rate at t. Since
f satisfies MHR, φ(t) < t/2 iff t ≤ k for some integer 1 ≤ k ≤ L. Furthermore, φ(k) = k−1/h(k) ≤ k/2.
This implies for all t ≤ k, h(t) ≤ h(k) ≤ 2/k.
Therefore, Pr[φ(t) ≥ t/2] = Pr[t > k]. To bound the latter quantity, replace f with a continuous-valued
distribution fˆ whose density in [t, t+1) for any integer t ∈ [1, L] is precisely f(t). It is easy to see that this
new density also satisfies the hazard rate condition. Let Gˆ(t) = 1−
∫ t+1
q=1 fˆ(q)dq, and let hˆ(t) =
fˆ(t)
Gˆ(t)
. Thus,
Pr[φ(t) ≥ t/2] = Pr[t > k] = G(k) = Gˆ(k) = e−
∫ k+1
t=1
hˆ(t)dt ≥ e−
∫ k+1
t=1
2
k
dt ≥ e−2
Observation 1. Let v∗ij = argminr{ϕij(r) ≥ r2}. Then, Lemma 3.3 and Claim 3.2 imply Pr[Vij ≥ v∗ij ] ≥
e−2.
3.2.1 Incorporating Virtual Valuations
Now consider the following linear program obtained from (LPREV).
Maximize
∑
i,j
∑
r
fij(r)ϕij(r)xij(r) (LP2)
∑
j
∑
r fij(r)xij(r) ≤ ni ∀i (1)∑
j
∑
r fij(r)ϕij(r)xij(r) ≤ Bi ∀i (2)∑
i
∑
r fij(r)xij(r) ≤ 1 ∀j (3)
xij(r) ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, j, r (4)
Lemma 3.4. The value of (LP2) is at least 12e2 times the value of (LPREV).
Proof. In the optimal solution to (LPREV), since Pr[Vij ≥ v∗ij ] ≥ e−2 by Lemma 3.3 and since xij(r) is
monotone in r, setting xij(r) = 0 for r < v∗ij loses a factor of at most e2 in the objective value and preserves
feasibility. Now replacing r by ϕij(r) ∈ [r/2, r] for r ≥ v∗ij loses another factor of 2 by Lemma 3.3, and
preserves feasibility. This shows a feasible solution to (LP2) of value at least 1
2e2
times that of (LPREV).
9
Lemma 3.5. The optimal solution to (LP2) is as follows: For each (i, j), we have a convex combination
of two solutions. The first (resp. second) solution has variables yij(r) (resp. zij(r)), and value r∗ij ≤ Bi/4
(resp. s∗ij = r∗ij+1 ≤ Bi/4) so that if r < r∗ij , then yij = 0, else yij = 1. Similarly, if r < s∗ij , then zij = 0,
else zij = 1. If the first solution has weight pij in the convex combination, and the second 1− pij , then:∑
r
fij(r)ϕij(r)xij(r) = pijr
∗
ij Pr[Vij ≥ r
∗
ij ] + (1− pij)s
∗
ij Pr[Vij ≥ s
∗
ij] (1)
Proof. For each (i, j) if xij(r1), xij(r2) ∈ (0, 1) for r1 < r2 ≤ Bi/4, then xij(r1) can be increased and
xij(r2) can be decreased to preserve
∑
r ϕij(r)fij(r)xij(r). Sinceϕij(r) is a monotonically non-decreasing
function of r, this implies
∑
r fij(r)xij(r) must decrease in this process, preserving all constraints. When
this process terminates, we must have xij(r) = 0 for all r < r∗ and xij(r) = 1 for all r > r∗ for some
r∗. This implies the optimal solution to (LP2) can be written in the fashion implied by the lemma, with
r∗ij = r
∗ and pij = xij(r∗). By Myerson’s characterization of virtual valuations [24], we have:
∑
r
fij(r)ϕij(r)xij(r) =
∑
r
(
fij(r)
(
rxij(r)−
r−1∑
s=1
xij(s)
))
Since yij(r) is a 0/1 step function, it is easy to see that
∑
r
(
fij(r)
(
ryij(r)−
r−1∑
s=1
yij(s)
))
= r∗ij Pr[Vij ≥ r
∗
ij]
A similar equality holds for zij , and taking a convex combination completes the proof of the lemma.
3.2.2 Posted Price Mechanism and Analysis
The posted price auction is described in Figure 2. Note that though the scheme is randomized, since it is
posted price, it is universally and ex-post truthful and individually rational.
Theorem 3.6. The revenue of the posted price auction (Figure 2) is a O(1) approximation to the optimal
BIC mechanism, when the valuations of a bidder follow product distributions that satisfy the MHR condition.
Proof. We show that for every pair (i, j), the mechanism achieves a revenue that is within a constant factor
of
∑
r fij(r)ϕij(r)xij(r) in (LP2) for the pair. First note that if a price is posted according to the mechanism
in Figure 2 just along edge (i, j), then by Equation (1), the expected revenue is simply:
pijr
∗
ij Pr[Vij ≥ r
∗
ij ] + (1− pij)s
∗
ij Pr[Vij ≥ s
∗
ij ] =
∑
r
fij(r)ϕij(r)xij(r)
We will now show that even in the presence of other items and bidders, a constant factor of this revenue
is extracted. For pair (i, j), let Xij be the 0/1 random variable denoting whether item j is taken by bidder
i, and let Pij denote the price at which it is taken (which is 0 if the item is not taken by the bidder). These
are random variables that depend on the prior distributions as well as the random choices made in choosing
the structured solution and the mechanism. Since the probability that any (i, j) is considered at all is 1/4,
the constraints of (LP2), when scaled down by factor 4, imply by linearity of expectation that for all i, j:
E[
∑
k 6=j
Pik] ≤ Bi/4, E[
∑
k 6=j
Xik] ≤ ni/4, and E[
∑
m6=i
Xmj ] ≤ 1/4
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Posted Price Auction
1. Choose an arbitrary but fixed ordering of all bidders and denote it by 1, . . . ,m
2. Solve LP2
3. FOR each (i, j)
Independently pick one of the two solutions in the convex combination (see Lemma 3.5)
with probability equal to its weight in the combination.
4. Let r˜ij denote the threshold in the chosen solution where the allocation function y˜ij jumps
from zero to one.
5. Initialize J to be the set of all items.
FOR i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
Initialize Wi ← ∅
FOR each item j ∈ J
Wi ← Wi ∪ {j} w.p. 14
Only the set of items Wi is offered to bidder i
Each j ∈Wi is offered at a price r˜ij
Bidder i buys a subset of items Si ⊆Wi
J ← J \ Si
Figure 2: DSIC Mechanism for independent valuations
Note that snce the valuation vij is independent of other valuations, this implies the above statements hold
regardless of vij . Now applying Markov’s inequality, we have for all i, j:
Pr[
∑
k 6=j
Pik ≥ 3Bi/4] ≤ 1/3, Pr[
∑
k 6=j
Xik ≥ ni] ≤ 1/4, and Pr[
∑
m6=i
Xmj ≥ 1] ≤ 1/4
By union bounds, this implies that with probability at least 1/6, we must have:
∑
k 6=j Pik < 3Bi/4,∑
k 6=jXik < ni, and
∑
m6=iXmj = 0. In this event, item j is offered to bidder i w.p. 1/4 (using one
of two random choices of the posted price from Lemma 3.5). Furthermore, in this event, the bidder must
take the item if vij ≥ r˜ij , since r˜ij ≤ Bi/4 (so that the bidder has sufficient budget to purchase this item),
and the bidder has not exhausted his demand ni. Since the valuation vij itself is independent of the event that
the item j is offered to bidder i, this implies that with probability at least 1/6× 1/4, the posted price mech-
anism obtains revenue
∑
r fij(r)ϕij(r)xij(r) along each (i, j) (using the definition of the latter quantity
from Equation (1)). By linearity of expectation over all (i, j), we have a O(1) approximation.
Corollary 3.7. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.6, if there are no budget constraints, then the revenue
of the sequential posted price mechanism is a constant factor approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Proof. If the Budget Constraint (2) is removed from (LPREV), it is an upper bound on the optimal social
welfare that can be obtained by any mechanism. The rest of the analysis remains the same.
3.3 General Distributions
The key point shown by Theorem 3.6 is that the optimal revenue of an ex-post truthful mechanism is ap-
proximated to a constant factor by a simple sequential posted price auction, where the prices are posted for
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each item and each bidder. This crucially used the monotone hazard rate condition. The natural question to
ask is whether such a simple mechanism is a good approximation for more general classes of distributions.
Note that even for one bidder, the optimal DSIC mechanism will in general price bundles of items. We show
below that bundle pricing has a logarithmic advantage over item pricing even for regular distributions (see
Definition 3), and that this gap is tight.
Theorem 3.8. Suppose vij ∈ [1, L], are independent for different (i, j) but do not necessarily satisfy the
monotone hazard rate condition. Then, there is a Θ(logL) gap between the revenues of the optimal posted
price scheme and the optimal DSIC mechanism. The lower bound holds for regular distributions and one
bidder.
Proof. To show the lower bound, consider the following scenario: There is only one bidder, n items, and no
budget or demand constraints. The valuations are i.i.d. for each item j, and follow the common distribution
with G(r) = Pr[v ≥ r] = 1r , for r = 1, 2, . . . , n, so that n = L. This distribution is regular, since
ϕ(r) = −1 for r < n, and ϕ(n) = n− 1. We have E[v1j ] = Hn for all item j, and by Chernoff bounds,
Pr[
n∑
j=1
v1j ≤ (1− ǫ)nHn] ≤ e
−nHnǫ
2
2n = o(1)
Therefore, a scheme that sets a price of nHn(1−ǫ) for the bundle of n items sells the bundle with probability
1 − o(1), so that the expected revenue is Ω(n log n). Any posted price scheme can extract a revenue of
maxi i ·G(i) = 1 from each item, so that the expected revenue from n items is at most n. This shows a gap
of Ω(log n) = Ω(logL).
The upper bound follows from a standard scaling argument. We start with (LPREV) which upper bounds
the optimal achievable revenue. For each (i, j), group the r values in powers of 2 so that there are O(logL)
groups. Let group Gk denote the interval [2k, 2k+1).
The first step is to solve (LPREV). Let its optimal value be OPT ; note that this is a 4 approximation to
the optimal ex-post incentive compatible scheme. Now, for each (i, j) perform the following rounding. Let
kij = argmaxk
∑
r∈Gk
rfij(r)xij(r)
r∗ij = 2
kij
x∗ij =
∑
r∈Gk
fij(r)xij(r)∑
r∈Gk
fij(r)
Qij = Pr[V˜ij ≥ r
∗
ij ]
Since xij(r) is monotone in r, it is easy to observe that:
1. x∗ij ≤ xij(r) for r ∈ Gk for k > k∗ij . This implies x∗ijQij ≤
∑
r fij(r)xij(r).
2.
∑
r∈Gkij
rfij(r)xij(r) ≤ 2r
∗
ijx
∗
ij Pr[r ∈ Gkij ].
3. maxk
∑
r∈Gk
rfij(r)xij(r) = Ω(1/ log L)
∑
r rfij(r)xij(r).
4. Therefore, r∗ijx∗ijQij = Ω(1/ logL)
∑
r rfij(r)xij(r). Furthermore, r∗ijx∗ijQij ≤
∑
r rfij(r)xij(r).
The above directly implies
∑
i,j r
∗
ijx
∗
ijQij = Ω(OPT/ logL), and the following constraints:∑
j x
∗
ijQij ≤ ni ∀i∑
j r
∗
ijx
∗
ijQij ≤ Bi ∀i∑
i x
∗
ijQij ≤ 1 ∀j
x∗ij ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, j
r∗ij ∈ [0, Bi/4] ∀i, j
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The final mechanism chooses an arbitrary ordering of bidders. When bidder i is encountered, let Si denote
the subset of items that have survived so far. For each item j ∈ Si, with probability x∗ij/4, post price r∗ij ,
and with the remaining probability skip this item. This process is done simultaneously for all items, and
the resulting items and prices are simultaneously offered to the bidder. Note that though the scheme is
randomized, since it is posted price, it is universally and ex-post truthful and individually rational. Using
the same proof as Theorem 3.6 now shows that this posted price scheme extracts revenue that is a constant
factor of
∑
i,j r
∗
ijx
∗
ijQij . This shows a O(logL) approximation.
3.3.1 Adaptive Posted Price Schemes
The above implies we cannot generalize the result in Section 3.2 even to the class of regular distributions
(see Definition 3). This is because an ω(1) gap is introduced in going from (LPREV) to (LP2). However,
we can show that if the space of mechanisms is restricted, (LP2) itself is a good relaxation to the optimal
revenue in this space.
In particular, suppose we restrict the space of mechanisms to be those that are posted price, and sequen-
tial by bidder: Depending on the subset of items and bidders left, the mechanism adaptively chooses the next
bidder and posts prices for a subset of the remaining items. The bidder being a utility maximizer, solves
a knapsack problem to choose the optimal subset of items. Once this bidder is dealt with, the mechanism
again adaptively chooses the next bidder depending on the acceptance strategy of this bidder. Assuming the
valuations of a bidder follow a product distribution, and vij follows a regular distribution, we will show a
O(1) approximation to the optimal mechanism.
Since the optimization problem the bidders need to solve is a two-dimensional KNAPSACK problem
which is NP-HARD, we we assume bidders are monotone optimizers in the following sense: For any edge
(i, j), if all valuations except vij are fixed, the quantity of item j taken by bidder i is monotonically non-
decreasing in vij . This is true if the bidder solves KNAPSACK optimally. As with the posted price scheme
in the previous section, our algorithm itself will allow arbitrary KNAPSACK heuristics as long as a bidder
chooses all items if she is not constrained by either demand or budget.
Lemma 3.9. (LP2) is a 4-approximation to the revenue of the optimal adaptive posted price scheme as-
suming bidders are monotone optimizers.
Proof. In the discussion below, recall the definition Vij = min(vij , Bi/4) from Definition 1, and observe
that its density function fij satisfies the regularity condition. For any adaptive mechanism, let xij(r) denote
the expected allocation of item j to bidder i conditioned on Vij = r, and let pij(r) denote the corre-
sponding expected price paid scaled down by a factor of 4. We will show that the LP relaxation that is a
4-approximation to maximizing expected revenue is the following:
Maximize
∑
i,j
∑
r
fij(r)pij(r) (LPSEQ)
∑
j
∑
r fij(r)xij(r) ≤ ni ∀i (1)∑
j
∑
r fij(r)pij(r) ≤ Bi ∀i (2)∑
i
∑
r fij(r)xij(r) ≤ 1 ∀j (3)
rxij(r)−
∑r−1
s=1 xij(s) ≥ pij(r) ∀i, j, r (4)
xij(r) ≥ xij(s) ∀i, j, r ≥ s ≥ 0 (5)
pij(r) ≥ pij(s) ∀i, j, r ≥ s ≥ 0 (6)
xij(r) ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, j, r (7)
To see this, fix all valuations except vij . If the mechanism considers item j for bidder i, then it posts a
unique price p∗ ≤ Bi for (i, j). Let Xij(r) ∈ [0, 1] denote the expected quantity taken when Vij = r, and
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let Pij(r) = p∗Xij(r) denote the expected price paid. Note that as long as r < Bi/4, vij = r and Xij(r)
is either 0 or 1. However, at r = Bi/4, vij is not unique and Xij(r) can take a fractional value. Since the
bidder is a utility maximizer, Xij(r) (and hence Pij(r)) are monotone functions of r. Furthermore, it is
easy to check that rXij(r) −
∑r−1
s=1Xij(s) ≥ p
∗Xij(r)/4 = Pij(r)/4. Defining xij(r) = E[Xij(r)] and
pij(r) = E[Pij(r)]/4, where the expectation is over the remaining valuations, we see that all constraints in
the above LP hold.
Consider the optimal solution to (LPSEQ), and focus on edge (i, j). Let gij(r) = rxij(r)−
∑r−1
s=1 xij(s).
This is a monotone function of r, and so is pij(r) ≤ gij(r). Consider the lexicographically maximal
solution where it cannot be the case that pij(r) can be increased and some pij(s) for s > r can be decreased
preserving all constraints and the objective. Let r0 be the largest integer such that for all r < r0, gij(r) =
pij(r). It is easy to see that for all r ≥ r0, we have pij(r) = pij(r0), else the lexicographic maximality
property is violated. Now, reduce xij(r0) until pij(r0) = gij(r0). Observe that if xij(r) is set to xij(r0)
for all r > r0, all constraints are preserved and the objective is unchanged. This also ensures that pij(r) =
gij(r) for all r ≥ 0. This makes Constraints (4) and (6) irrelevant since the former is tight and implies the
latter via Constraint (5). Thus, (LPSEQ) reduces to:
Maximize
∑
i,j
∑
r
fij(r)
(
rxij(r)−
r−1∑
s=0
xij(s)
)
∑
j
∑
r fij(r)xij(r) ≤ ni ∀i∑
j
∑
r fij(r)
(
rxij(r)−
∑r−1
s=1 xij(s)
)
≤ Bi ∀i∑
i
∑
r fij(r)xij(r) ≤ 1 ∀j
xij(r) ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, j, r
Now, by Myerson’s characterization [24], we have:
∑
r
(
fij(r)
(
rxij(r)−
r−1∑
s=1
xij(s)
))
=
∑
r
fij(r)ϕij(r)xij(r)
Plugging this formula into the objective and the second constraint completes the proof.
The final mechanism and analysis are the same as in Section 3.2: Solve (LP2), decompose it into
a convex combination of posted prices per edge, and sequentially post these prices for every bidder. To
complete the analysis, note that Lemma 3.5 only requires that the distribution be regular. This shows the
following theorem:
Theorem 3.10. There is a O(1) approximation to the revenue of the optimal adaptive posted price scheme,
when the types follow product distributions, and for each (i, j), the distribution of valuation is regular.
Acknowledgments: We thank Shuchi Chawla, Vincent Conitzer, and Peng Shi for helpful discussions.
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